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CASE COMMENTS
RANDOM LICENSE AND VEHICLE REGISTRATION STOPS DECLARED
UNREASONABLE UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Delaware v. Prouse, 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979)
In Delaware v. Prouset the Supreme Court resolved a conflict among
jurisdictions2 concerning the constitutionality3 of random4 license and
vehicle registration checks.'
Defendant, indicted for possession of a controlled substance, moved
to suppress evidence seized from his automobile by a police officer dur-
ing the course of a stop and detention6 conducted to check his license7
and vehicle registration." Finding that this procedure violated the
1. 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979).
2. Compare, e.g., United States v. Montgomery, 561 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1977), State v.
Ochoa, 23 Ariz. App. 510, 534 P.2d 441 (1975), rev'don other grounds, 112 Ariz. 582, 544 P.2d 1097
(1976), People v. Singleton, 41 N.Y.2d 402, 361 N.E.2d 1003, 393 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1977), People v.
Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413,330 N.E.2d 39, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1975), and Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453
Pa. 107, 307 A.2d 875 (1973), with United States v. Jenkins, 528 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1975), United
States v. Kelley, 462 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1972), United States v. Turner, 442 F.2d 1146 (8th Cir.
1971), Myricks v. United States, 370 F.2d 901 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 386 U.S. 1015 (1967),
State v. Allen, 282 N.C. 503, 194 S.E.2d 9 (1973), and Leonard v. State, 496 S.W.2d 576 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1973). See also United States v. Cupps, 503 F.2d 277 (6th Cir. 1974); Palmore v.
United States, 290 A.2d 573 (D.C. 1972), afd on jurisdictional grounds only, 411 U.S. 389 (1973);
State v. Holmberg, 194 Neb. 337, 231 N.W.2d 672 (1975); notes 72, 75, 78 infra.
3. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
4. The Court's use of the word "random" connotes arbitrariness, unbridled discretion, or
lack of administrative and procedural guidelines. See Lukoff, Delaware v. Prouse: Supreme Court
Halls Random Automobile Stops, 6 SEARCH AND SEIZURE L. REP. I (May 1979).
5. The Court's holding in Prouse is limited to passenger vehicles. The permissibility of
truck weigh-stations and checkpoint operations was not at issue. 99 S. Ct. at 1401 n.26. The
Delaware vehicle licensing statute similarly exempted operators of farm equipment, road machin-
ery, and members of the armed services. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, §§ 2705(a), (b) (1975).
6. After halting the automobile, the police officer approached the car and noticed the scent
of marijuana emanating from the car. While observing the occupants step out of the automobile,
the officer noticed a cellophane bag protruding from beneath the front seat. The bag was later
found to contain marijuana. State v. Prouse, 382 A.2d 1359, 1361 (Del. 1978).
7. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2707 (1975 & Supp. 1978) (licensing qualification).
8: Id § 2109 (Supp. 1978) (motor vehicle registration requirement). Id § 2110(b) (1975)
(periodic renewal of registration required). The Delaware Supreme Court referred to defendant
as the operator of the vehicle. 382 A.2d 1359, 1361 (Del. 1978). The trial court referred to defend-
ant as one of four occupants of the vehicle. The arresting officer did not know if defendant was
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fourth amendment,9 the trial court granted the motion to suppress, I0
and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed."' The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari 2 and held. To stop an automobile
solely to conduct a check of the driver's license and the vehicle's regis-
tration, the fourth amendment requires a law enforcement official to
have at least an articulable and reasonable suspicion that the motorist
is unlicensed, the automobile is not registered, or the vehicle or an oc-
cupant is otherwise subject to seizure for a violation of law.' 3
The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution protects
persons against unreasonable searches and seizures.' 4 Except for a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions,'- warrantless
the driver or a passenger in the vehicle. 99 S. Ct. at 1394 n.l. Petitioner referred to defendant as
the registered owner and operator of the vehicle. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 3, Delaware v.
Prouse, 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979).
9. 99 S. Ct. at 1394.
10. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 3-4.
11. 382 A.2d 1359 (Del. 1978). The Delaware Supreme Court found that the stop violated
the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, § 6 of the
Delaware Constitution. 99 S. Ct. at 1394. See note 71 infra.
12. 439 U.S. 816 (1978).
13. 99 S. Ct. at 1401.
14. The Supreme Court applied the fourth amendment to the states through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), although the Court
refused to apply the federal exclusionary rule. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Court
applied the exclusionary rule to state criminal proceedings. See generally Stanford v. Texas, 379
U.S. 476, 481-85 (1965); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 724-29 (1960); Frank v. Mary-
land, 359 U.S. 360, 363-65 (1958); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 621-22 (1886); R. DAVIS,
FEDERAL SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, § 7.8 (1964); N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT
OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1937); Amsterdam, Per-
spectiver on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974); Bacigal, Some Observations and
Proposals on the Nature ofthe Fourth Amendment, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 529 (1978). For a
discussion of the relationship between the two clauses of the fourth amendment, see J. LANDYN-
SKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 42-43 (1966); Player, Warrantless Searches
and Seizures, 5 GA. L. REV. 269 (1971).
15. "The exceptions are 'jealously and carefully drawn,' and there must be 'a showing by
those who seek exemption ... that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.'"
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971) (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335
U.S. 451, 456 (1948)). The recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement are (1) hot pursuit,
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1966) (search in quest of fleeing felon); Gf. Hester v. United
States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924) (admission of testimony on occurrences while in hot pursuit), (2) plain
view, Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (discovery of evidence in impounded vehicle),
(3) emergency situation, Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
860 (1963) (emergency search to protect health and life); People v. Smith, 47 I11. 2d 161, 265
N.E.2d 139 (1970) (same); see Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) (search of automobile
subsequent to accident); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (emergency search to pre-
vent destruction of evidence); People v. Clark, 547 P.2d 267 (Colo. App. 1975) (same), (4) automo-
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searches and seizures 16 are "per se unreasonable" under the fourth
amendment. 17 Evidence obtained as a result of an unreasonable search
or seizure is inadmissible in a criminal prosecution against the victim of
that constitutional violation.'"
The search of automobiles by law-enforcement officials is one excep-
tion to the warrant requirement. 19 In Carroll v. United States2" the
bile search, see cases cited at note 19 infra, (5) consent, United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164
(1974) (third-party consent search); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969) (warrantless search of
jointly held property), and (6) searches incident to arrest, United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
(1973) (warrantless search incident to arrest for traffic violation); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S
752 (1969) (limits on scope of warrantless search incident to arrest); United States v. Rabinovitz,
339 U.S. 56 (1950) (right to search immediate surroundings at time of arrest).
See generally J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 14, at 87-117 (1966); Haddad, Well Delineated Excep-
tions, Claims of Sham, and Fourfold Probable Cause, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198 (1977);
Player, supra note 14; Williamson, The Supreme Court, Warrantless Searches, and Exigent Circum-
stances, 31 OKLA. L. REv. 110 (1978).
The arresting officer's discovery in Prouse of the marijuana while defendant stepped out of the
automobile, see note 6 supra, raised an issue concerning the applicability of the plain view excep-
tion to this case. The Court did not reach this question in Prouse, however, because all courts
ruling on the case had recognized that the initial detention was unreasonable; thus, the plain view
exception was unavailable, see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), and the Court
did not need to discuss the issue. See 99 S. Ct. at 1394. See generally Williamson, supra, at 131-
38.
16. The stop in Prouse was a seizure cognizable under the fourth amendment. 99 S. Ct. at
1396. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 (1976) (checkpoint stop by border
patrol is seizure within scope of fourth amendment); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
873, 878 (1975) (stop by roving border patrol is seizure within scope of fourth amendment). See
generaly United States v. Mallides, 473 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Nicholas, 448
F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1971); 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT§ 10.8, at 381 n.16 (1978); seealso Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Davis v.
Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); note 48 infra.
17. Eg., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483
(1964); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1959). The concept underlying the traditional warrant
requirement is a fundamental distrust of official discretion. Reich, Police QuestioningofLawAbid-
mg Citizens, 75 YALE L.J. 1161 (1966). The warrant procedure limits government intrusion and
officer discretion by requiring prior approval of a neutral and detached magistrate. See Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967).
18. If the initial detention is unreasonable, subsequent discoveries of evidence are inadmissi-
ble against the defendant. See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 286 (1978); Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 16, at §§ 1.1-.I I. The exclusionary
rule bars admission at trial of materials obtained as a direct result of an unlawful invasion. See
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (exclusionary rule extends to intangible items); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary rule applies to state criminal proceedings); Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (exclusionary rule applies to all federal criminal proceedings);
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (fourth amendment bars evidence illegally secured
from use in federal prosecution). See also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583
(1974); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
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Supreme Court upheld automobile searches because of the exigent cir-
cumstances21 resulting from the mobility of vehicles.2 Later decisions
added, as an additional rationale for the exception, that automobile
travelers have lower expectations of privacy than those of persons in-
volved in other areas protected by the fourth amendment. 23 Despite
the exigent circumstances and lower expectations of privacy, the Court
generally requires that a warrantless detention and search of an auto-
mobile meet the reasonableness requirement of the fourth amendment
through a showing of probable cause.24
Traditionally, proof of reasonableness required a full showing of
probable cause to justify issuance of a warrant or to vindicate a war-
rantless search. In several recent search and seizure cases, however,
U.S. 443 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364
(1964); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925). See generally Williamson, supra note 15; Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of
Automobiles, 87 HARV. L. REV. 835 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Warrantless Searches]; Note, Mo-
bility Reconsidered- Extending the Carroll Doctrine to Movable Items, 58 IowA L. REV. 1134
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Mobility Reconsidered; Note, Misstating the Exigency Rule: The
Supreme Court v. The Exigency Requirement in Warrantless Automobile Searches, 28 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 981 (1977).
20. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
21. Id at 153. "[l~t is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought." Id See Warrant.
less Searches, supra note 19, at 836-37.
22. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977); Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U.S. 266, 269 (1973); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925). The Court in
Carroll listed ships, motorboats, and wagons as other mobile vehicles, but left unclear the degree
of mobility necessary to permit a warrantless search. See generally Murray & Aiken, Constitu-
tional Limitations on Automobile Searches, 3 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 95, 100-01 (1970); Warrantless
Searches, supra note 19, at 839 n.24; Mobility Reconsidered, supra note 19, at 1149-60.
23. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); South Dakota v. Opper-
man, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S.
433 (1973); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42
(1970); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). See Williamson, supra note 15, at 128-42.
See generally Mobility Reconsidered, supra note 19.
24. Reasonableness demands that the searching officer have probable cause to believe either
that the vehicle contains contraband or other evidence of a particular crime or that the automobile
is involved in the commission of a crime. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977);
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); Coo-
lidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
25. "Probable cause exists where 'the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge
and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to war-
rant a man of reasonable caution in belief that an offense has been or is being committed." Brine-
gar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
162 (1925)); see Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 35 (1968)
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the Court has allowed exceptions to the probable cause requirement by
using a more flexible balancing test.26 Under this test the Court weighs
the need for the governmental activity27 and the availability of less in-
trusive means to satisfy that need2" against the resulting intrusion on
individual rights29 to determine the degree of cause or suspicion neces-
(Douglas, J., dissenting); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471 (1963).
26. The confusion surrounding the terminology "probable cause" and "reasonable cause" or
"suspicion" results in part from the Court's and commentators' use of the two concepts inter-
changeably. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (for purposes of administrative
search, probable cause justifying issuance of warrant may be based on showing that reasonable
legislative or administrative standards are satisfied). See also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 538 (1967); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1959); Armentano, The Stan-
dardfor Probable Cause Under the Fourth Amendment, 44 CONN. B.J. 137, 179 (1970); Haddad,
supra note 15; Note, Scope Limitationsfor Searches Incident to Arrest, 78 YALE L.J. 433, 438 n.28
(1969).
Probable cause and reasonable suspicion are theoretically and practically distinguishable.
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968); 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 18, at § 3.2. Both probable
cause and reasonable suspicion must meet a test of reasonableness, but the Court defines reason-
able suspicion in terms of a more flexible balancing process. See, e.g., Draper v. United States,
358 U.S 307, 313 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949); 45 TEMPLE L.Q. 610,
615 (1972). See Player, supra note 14, at 276 (1971). Thus, in application the reasonable suspicion
standard for measuring the requisite quantum of evidence is less rigorous and demands a lesser
showing of evidence. See, eg., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968); Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 18, at § 3.2. See MODEL CODE OF PRE-
ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 3.01 & Commentary 1-8 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1969). See generally
Amsterdam, supra note 14, at 390; Bacigal, supra note 14; Weisgal, Stop, Search and Seize: The
Emerging Doctrine of Founded Suspicion, 9 U.S.F. L. REv. 219 (1974). The evidence justifying an
administrative safety inspection, for example, may be a characteristic of the buildings in the area
(such as age and condition of repair) rather than information on a violation in the target building.
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 538.
27. The Court has acknowledged governmental interests in (1) public health and safety, e.g.,
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972);
Colannade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523 (1967), (2) crime prevention, detection, and investigation, e.g., Adams v. Williams, 407
U.S. 143 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), (3) police safety, e.g., Adams v. Williams, 407
U.S. 143 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and (4) control of smuggling and illegal immi-
gration, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. Ortiz, 422
U.S. 891 (1975); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). See 24 WAYNE L. REv. 1123, 1130 (1978).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-57 (1976); United States v.
Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972); Camera v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537-38 (1967).
29. The intrusion element has included consideration of the following: (1) the extent of the
search, see cases cited note 20 supra, (2) the nature of the premises searched, residential, e.g., See
v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) or com-
mercial, e.g., Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S.
311 (1972); Colannade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970), (3) the extent to which
the search is personal, e.g., Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17
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sary to assure the reasonableness of a search and seizure.3
The Court has applied this balancing test in administrative search
cases,' "stop and frisk" cases,32 and border patrol cases.33 In one
group of administrative search cases, for example, the Court recognized
the considerable need for physically sound residential and commercial
buildings to protect the public health and safety34 and noted the virtual
impossibility of conducting interior inspections by less-intrusive
(1968), (4) the length of delay resulting from the search or seizure, e.g., United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880 (1975), (5) the
existence of broad congressional power to regulate the area searched, e.g., United States v. Bis-
well, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Colannade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970), (6) the
history of regulation, e.g., Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978); United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Colannade
Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970), (7) the degree to which the intrusion should
be expected, e.g., Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978); United States v. Martinez-Fu-
erte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); United States v.
Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Colannade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970);
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), (8) the subjective responses of the persons af-
fected by the intrusion, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558 (1976); United
States v. Ortiz, 422 U S. 891, 894 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25 (1968), and (9) the discre-
tion of the officers engaged in the fourth amendment activity, e.g., United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). See 24 WAYNE L.
REv. 1123, 1131 (1978).
30. 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1123, 1125 (1978). See 3 W. LAFAVE supra note 18, at § 10.8, 382-83.
In discussing the balancing test in the context of vehicle regulation, the author states that judicial
analyses weigh three elements: (1) a strong public interest in maximum effectiveness in combating
the problem at hand; (2) the inability of the government to achieve acceptable results by following
the usual probable cause limitation; and (3) the degree of intrusion upon the victim's reasonable
expectations of privacy. Id See also Note, Elimination ofArbitraryAutomobile Stops" Theory and
Practice, 4 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 327 (1976); Note, Automobile License Checks and the Fourth
Amendment, 60 VA. L. REV. 666 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Automobile License Checks].
31. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (inspection of business premises under
OSHA); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (regulation and inspection of premises of
firearms dealers); Wyman v. Jones, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (search of residential premises of welfare
recipients); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (regulation and inspec-
tion of premises of liquor dealers); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (search of business
premises for fire code violations); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (inspection of
residence to determine compliance with building code).
32. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) (investigatory stop and frisk of motorist); Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk of pedestrian). See also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S.
40 (1968); Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
33. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (border patrol checkpoint stop);
United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975) (search and seizure at checkpoints removed from bor-
der); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (roving border patrol stop); Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (roving border patrol stop).
34. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,
535-38 (1967). See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 316 (1978) (OSHA inspection aimed
at detection of safety hazards and regulatory violations).
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means.35 Against this need, the Court balanced the intrusion upon the
sanctity and security of the premises involved in interior administrative
inspections36 and concluded that "administrative reasonableness" 37 is
sufficient to justify an interior inspection of residential38 or commer-
cial39 premises under the fourth amendment.4°
The Court determined the constitutionality of "stop and frisk" en-
counters between police and citizens by balancing the governmental
interests in crime prevention and detection4 ' and in police safety42
against a severe but limited intrusion on individual rights.4 3 Such en-
counters are reasonable if the officer possesses a "reasonable suspi-
cion" 4 of wrongdoing before initiating the encounter.45
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce46 and United States v. Martinez-
35. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541,545 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,
537-38 (1967). In Marshall the Court did not consider the availability of less-intrusive means.
36. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,
531 (1967). See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312-14 (1978) (intrusion upon proprie-
tor's reasonable expectation of privacy).
37. "Administrative reasonableness" differs from traditional probable cause in that interior
inspections within a particular area may be justified by a lesser quantum of evidence. See note 26
supra.
38. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
39. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
40. See generally 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1123, 1125 (1978). Certain administrative searches of
federally licensed business such as gun and liquor dealers are exceptions to the warrant require-
ment. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (search of premises of firearms and ammuni-
tions dealers); Colannade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (inspection of
premises of liquor dealers). The Court upheld warrantless administrative inspection because of
the industry's history of broad congressional regulation, id. at 77, and viewed consent to regula-
tion as concomitant to participation in the regulated industry, 406 U.S. at 316. See also note 69
infra.
41. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-47 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1968).
42. 407 U.S. at 146; 392 U.S. at 23-24 & n.21. See also Pennsylvania v. Minms, 434 U.S. 106
(1977).
43. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1968). The Terry Court did not consider whether less
burdensome alternatives were available to achieve the governmental interest. See generally
LaFave, "Street Encounters"and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters and Beyond, 67 MIcH. L.
REv. 40 (1968); Shea, Cars, Cops and Custody-Stopping and Searching Motorists in New York, 24
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 405 (1978); Note, Nonarrest ,4utomobile Stops: Unconstitutional Seizures of
the Person, 25 STAN. L. REV. 865 (1973).
44. 392 U.S. at 27. The majority in Terry stated that reasonableness in a stop and frisk
encounter is based on "specific reasonable inferences [the officer] is entitled to draw from the facts
in light of his experience." Id This standard has been rephrased as "reasonable suspicion." Id. at
37 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1972); note
26 supra.
45. See text accompanying notes 4143 supra.
46. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
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Fuerte,4 7 the Court applied the balancing test to determine the reasona-
bleness of border patrol stops of automobiles 8 Roving patrol stops49
serve an important governmental interest in restricting the influx of il-
legal aliens; less intrusive practices cannot adequately serve this need. 0
At the same time, even though such stops result in only a "modest"
intrusion upon the motorist,5' they allow unlimited discretion to border
47. 428 U.S. 543 (1976). In Martinez-Fuerte the United States Government established fixed
checkpoints along major highways in southern California. Officers detained all motorists at an
initial checkpoint and selected a small percentage (one percent) of all passing vehicles for more
detailed investigation at a secondary detention point. Approximately twenty percent of the motor-
ists directed to the second detention point were illegal immigrants. Id at 546. Seegenerally Note,
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte: The Fourth Amendment Close to the Edge?, 13 CAL. W.L. REv.
333 (1977); Note, The Alien Checkpoints and the Troublesome Tetralogy: United States v. Marti-
nez-Fuerte, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 257 (1976).
48. The border patrol maintains three types of surveillance along inland roads in the interest
of detecting the illegal importation of aliens and contraband goods: (I) permanent checkpoints at
certain nodal intersections; (2) temporary checkpoints at various times and places; and (3) roving
patrols. 428 U.S. at 552; Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 268 (1973).
The transition from the seizure of a pedestrian in Terry to the detention of a motorist as a
"seizure" is not clear from the Court's opinions, but the logical nexus is set forth in United States
v. Mallides, 473 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1973):
Although a pedestrian and an automobile driver are not in identical circumstances, we
see no reason why similar Fourth Amendment standards should not apply in both situa-
tions. A person whose vehicle is stopped by police and whose freedom to drive away is
restrained is as effectively 'seized' as is the pedestrian who is detained.
Id at 861. The Court in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), left no doubt that
stopping a mobile vehicle constitutes a "seizure" for purposes of the fourth amendment. Id at
878. See also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); Davis v. Mississippi, 394
U.S. 721 (1969); United States v. Nicholas, 448 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1971). Cf. Palmore v. United
States, 290 A.2d 573 (D.C. 1972), ajf'd on jurisdictional grounds only, 411 U.S. 389 (1973) (use of
balancing test implies recognition of the stop as a seizure under the fourth amendment); State v.
Allen, 282 N.C. 503, 194 S.E.2d 9 (1973) (routine stop of vehicle accompanied by seizure of bag of
money in plain view is seizure under fourth amendment); Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa.
107, 307 A.2d 875 (1973) (police officer stopping vehicle has seized the vehicle and fourth amend-
ment protections must be observed). But see Byrd v. State, 13 Md. App. 288, 283 A.2d 9 (Ct. Spec.
App. 1971); State v. Valstead, 282 Minn. 301, 165 N.W.2d 19 (1969); State v. Fish, 280 Minn. 163,
159 N.W.2d 786 (1968); People v. Frank, 61 Misc. 2d 450, 305 N.Y.S.2d 940 (Sup. Ct. 1969). See
generally Weisgall, supra note 26; Automobile License Checks, supra note 30; 4 FORDHAM URD.
L.J. 327, 329-30 (1976); note 69 infra.
49. See note 48 supra. See also United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975) (border officers
not entitled to search vehicles without consent or reasonable suspicion at traffic checkpoints re-
moved from border or functional equivalent); Ameida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266
(1973) (roving patrol automobile stop violates motorist's fourth amendment rights).
50. 422 U.S. at 878-79.
51. Id at 882-84 & n.8. The intrusion was upon "the individual's right to personal security
free from arbitrary interference by law officers." Id at 878 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21
(1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967)). See generally Note, asra note
43, at 872-78; note 29 supra.
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patrol agents. 2 Thus, border patrol officers must have at least "reason-
able suspicion" to meet the fourth amendment reasonableness require-
ment . 3  Checkpoint stops also fulfill the important governmental
interest in restricting the flow of illegal aliens into the country.-4 Fur-
thermore, checkpoint stops are less intrusive than roving patrol stops
because they offer visible signs of governmental authority55 and limit
the discretion of border patrol agents. 6 Finally, no less-intrusive
means of satisfying the governmental interest is available. For these
reasons no showing of cause is necessary to justify a checkpoint stop
under the fourth amendment reasonableness standard.5 7
In Brignoni-Ponce and Martinez-Fuerte the Court stated that its deci-
sions in the border patrol cases had no bearing upon the constitutional-
ity of random license checks." Numerous lower courts, however, have
52. 422 U.S. at 882-83 & n.8.
53. "Except at the border and its functional equivalents, officers on roving patrol may stop
vehicles only if they are aware of specific articulable facts. . . that reasonably warrant suspicion
that the vehicle contains aliens who may be illegally in the country."Id at 884.
Courts applying the reasonable suspicion standard after Terr
, 
have not agreed upon the facts
necessary to establish reasonable suspicion. Compare United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
873, 885-86 (1975) (apparent Mexican ancestry of motorist stopped near border does not reason-
ably warrant suspicion of immigration violation), with United States v. Granado, 453 F.2d 769
10th Cir. 1972) (Mexican ancestry of occupants of automobile stopped over 800 miles from bor-
der will support reasonable suspicion of immigration violation). Courts may consider the follow-
ing factors in determining the presence of reasonable suspicion: partially obscured license plates;
condition of the license plates as compared to that of the vehicle; number of persons in the vehicle;
driving behavior, appearance of the driver and passengers; ability to speak English; responses
given to the officer's questions; and indications that the vehicle may be heavily loaded. See
United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897 (1975); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,
884-85 (1975); United States v. Montgomery, 561 F.2d 875, 879-80 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
54. 428 U.S. at 551.
55. Id at 558; United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975). "The circumstances surrounding a
checkpoint stop are far less intrusive than those attending a roving patrol stop . . . . At traffic
checkpoints the motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of
the officer's authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion."
Id at 894-95.
56. 428 U.S. at 559. Although they exercise discretion in selecting the checkpoint location,
"officials will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on mo-
torists." Id But see note 47 supra and accompanying text. Officers exercise discretion in the
checkpoint stop (1) in selecting the location for the stop, 428 U.S. at 559, and (2) in selecting
motorists for inspection at a second detention point. See generally notes 93-95 infra.
57. 428 U.S. at 562.
58. Id. at 560 n.14; 422 U.S. at 883 n.8. "Our decision. . . does not imply that state and
local enforcement agencies are without power to conduct such limited stops as are necessary to
enforce laws regarding drivers' licenses, vehicle registration. . . and similar matters." Id. at 883
n.8.
The phrase "license check" denotes any police stop made on a routine basis for the purpose of
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confronted the issue,59 and their decisions can be classified into three
general groups. 60
A first group of cases61 focuses on the stopping procedure. Roving
license checks, in which selection is based on observation, are valid
only if the officer has a "reasonable suspicion" of some safety or crimi-
enforcing motor vehicle licensing and registration laws. See 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1123, 1130 n.52
(1978).
All states have vehicle licensing and registration statutes. See Automobile License Checks, supra
note 30, at 670 n.18; 1960 WASH. U.L.Q. 279, 279 n.l; 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1123, 1131 n.59 (1978).
Many statutes expressly authorize law-enforcement officials to stop cars for the purpose of exam-
ining driver's license and vehicle registration. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 321.05(1) (West 1975);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-183 (Repl. Vol. 1965); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-8 (Repl. Vol. 1972). See also
Automobile License Checks, supra note 30, at 670 n.22. Nearly all states whose statutes fail to
provide express authority for license checks have found the power to conduct such stops implicit
in their provision that permits officers to demand to see a motorist's driver's license. See, e.g.,
United States v. Lepinski, 460 F.2d 234, 237 (10th Cir. 1972) (New Mexico law); State v. Cobuzzi,
161 Conn. 371, 288 A.2d 439 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1017 (1972); State v. Frizzell, 207 Kan.
393, 485 P.2d 160 (1971); State v. Rankin, 477 S.W.2d 72 (Mo. 1972); State v. Braxton, 111 N.J.
Super. 191, 268 A.2d 40, rep'don other grounds, 57 N.J. 286, 271 A.2d 713 (1970); State v. Malo-
ney, 109 R.I. 166, 283 A.2d 34 (1971). See also Automobile License Checks, supra note 30, at 670-
71 n.24; 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1123, 1131 n.59 (1978).
Despite attempts to analogize state licensing statutes to federal regulatory statutes authorizing
search and seizure on a showing of cause, see note 40 supra, the courts have rejected this argu-
ment. E.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 270-72 (1973); United States v.
Montgomery, 561 F.2d 875, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 114,
307 A.2d 875, 879 (1973). "We reject any implication. . . that because an individual engages in a
regulated activity he thereby forfeits his Fourth Amendment rights." Id The Prouse Court simi-
larly found inapplicable to the license check situation those cases in which consent to regulatory
restrictions is viewed as concomitant with participation in the regulated industry. 99 S. Ct. at
1400.
59. See notes 62, 65, 68 infra.
60. See Automobile License Checks, supra note 30, at 673; 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1123, 1130
(1978). See generally 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 16, at § 10.8; Note, Warrantless Searches, supra
note 19; 4 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 327 (1976); 55 NEB. L. REV. 316 (1976).
61. Eg., United States v. McLeroy, 584 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Montgom-
ery, 561 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1977); United States v. McDevitt, 508 F.2d 8 (10th Cir. 1974); State v.
Ochoa, 23 Ariz. App. 510, 534 P.2d 441 (1975), rev'don other grounds, 112 Ariz. 582, 544 P.2d 1097
(1976); People v. McGaughran, 22 Cal. 3d 469, 585 P.2d 206, 149 Cal. Rptr. 469 (1979); Punch v.
United States, 377 A.2d 1353 (D.C.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 955 (1977); People v. Estrada, 68 111.
App. 3d 272, 386 N.E.2d 128 (1979); People v. Singleton, 41 N.Y.2d 402, 361 N.E.2d 1003, 393
N.Y.S.2d 353 (1977); People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413, 330 N.E.2d 39, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1975);
Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 307 A.2d 875 (1973); cf. United States v. Mallides, 473
F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1973) (license check issue not addressed, investigatory stop without reasonable
suspicion forbidden); United States v. Nicholas, 448 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1971) (license check issue
reserved, investigatory stop without reasonable suspicion forbidden); Commonwealth v. Pollard,
450 Pa. 138, 299 A.2d 233 (1973) (order to exit automobile invalid without reasonable suspicion).
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nal violation. 62 Checkpoint stops, as a less-intrusive means of satisfying
the state interest in highway safety, are valid without any showing of
cause.
6 3
A second group of cases permits random license checks at the of-
ficer's discretion if his motivation in stopping a motorist is solely to
determine compliance with licensing64 and registration regulations .6
To conduct a license check for the purpose of investigating a related
criminal activity, however, the officer must have a reasonable suspi-
cion.66 The courts in these cases attempt to maintain the license check
as a means of ensuring traffic safety, yet they recognize the possibility
of official abuse of discretion if motorists can be stopped as a pretext
for investigation.67
A final group of decisions extends absolute authority to law-enforce-
62. Cf Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (officer must point to specific and articulable facts
that reasonably warrant intrusion).
63. Eg., United States v. Montgomery, 561 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1977); People v. Ingle, 36
N.Y.2d 413, 330 N.E.2d 39, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1975); People v. Bennet, 47 A.D.2d 322, 366
N.Y.S.2d 639 (1975). See generally Note, supra note 43, at 875 n. 58; 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1123
(1978).
64. See City of Miami v. Aronovitz, 114 So. 2d 784, 787 (Fla. 1959) ("[T]he driver's license
requirement was enacted primarily as a source of revenue .... Time has proven, however, that
. . . this requirement has become an essential segment of our laws for the control and prevention
of traffic accidents and fatalities."); note 58 supra and accompanying text. But see 6 RuT.-CAM.
L.J. 85, 91, 115-16 (1974) (criticizing the view that licensing and registration play a substantial part
in traffic safety, the author argues that licensing and registration serve the purposes of raising
public revenue and facilitating the return of stolen property).
65. Eg., United States v. Carrizoza-Gaxiola, 523 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Cupps, 503 F.2d 277 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Lepinski, 460 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1972);
Amador-Gonzalez v. United States, 391 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1968); Lipton v. United States, 348
F2d 591 (9th Cir. 1965); United States v. Bell, 383 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Neb. 1974); State v. Smolen,
4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 385, 232 A.2d 339 (1967); Christmas v. United States, 314 A.2d 473 (D.C. 1974);
Palmore v. United States, 290 A.2d 573 (D.C. 1972), afj'd onjirisdictionalgrounds only, 411 U.S.
389 (1973); Mincy v. District of Columbia, 218 A.2d 507 (D.C. 1966); City of Miami v. Aronovitz,
114 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1959); State v. Bonds, 59 Hawaii 130, 577 P.2d 781 (1978); People v. Francis, 4
111. App. 3d 65, 280 N.E.2d 49 (1972); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 355 S.W.2d 686 (Ky. 1962);
State v. Holmberg, 194 Neb. 337, 231 N.W.2d 672 (1975).
66. See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., United States v. Carrizoza-Gaxiola, 523 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1975); United States
v. Cupps, 503 F.2d 277 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Bell, 383 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Neb. 1974);
Palmore v. United States, 290 A.2d 573 (D.C. 1972), af'd onjurisdictionalgrounds only, 411 U.S.
389 (1973); State v. Holmberg, 194 Neb. 337, 231 N.W.2d 672 (1975). The use of the license and
registration check as a pretext for investigation is not uncommon. See 3 W. LAFAvE, supra, note
16, at § 10.8, 386-92. It is difficult for a defendant-motorist to expose an officer's unlawful motive
m a pretext stop situation. See Note, Commonwealth v. Swanger-Spot Checks Eliminated, 47
TEMP. L.Q. 640, 645 (1974); Automobile License Checks, supra note 30, at 687-88; 55 NEB. L. REV.
316, 327 (1976). But see Montana v. Tomich, 332 F.2d 987 (9th Cir. 1964) (auto stop found uncon-
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ment officials to stop motorists for both investigatory and license-check
purposes.63 These cases place considerable emphasis on vehicle regula-
tion statutes that allow law-enforcement officials to stop motorists to
examine their driver's licenses and vehicle registrations. 69
In Delaware v. Prouse7 ° the Supreme Court acknowledged that stop-
ping and detaining a motorist to examine his license and vehicle regis-
tration constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the fourth and
fourteenth amendments." The Court determined the reasonableness
of random license checks by balancing the intrusion upon the individ-
ual's fourth amendment interests 72 against the need for the intrusion in
promoting legitimate governmental interests.73
stitutional on grounds that stop was pretext or ruse). See also Byrd v. State, 80 So. 2d 694 (Fla.
1955); State v. Shoemaker, 11 Wash. App. 187, 522 P.2d 203 (1976).
68. E.g., United States v. Jenkins, 528 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Kelley, 462
F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1972); United States v. Turner, 442 F.2d 1146 (8th Cir. 1971); Myricks v. United
States, 370 F.2d 901 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 386 U.S. 1015 (1976); Berger v. Cantor, 13 Ariz.
App. 555, 479 P.2d 432 (1970); State v. Allen, 282 N.C. 503, 194 S.E.2d 9 (1973); Leonard v. State,
496 S.W.2d 576 (rex. Crim. App. 1973).
69. See note 58 supra and accompanying text. One of the most frequently invoked justifica-
tions for reliance on vehicle regulatory statutes is the need for highway safety. See Petitioner's
Brief for Certiorari at 6-11, Delaware v. Prouse, 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979); 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note
16, at § 10.8, 383-84; note 64 supra. It is also argued that license checks are the only effective
means of enforcing driver's license and vehicle registration laws. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari
at 9-11; see Lipton v. United States, 348 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1965); State v. Allen, 282 N.C. 503, 194
S.E.2d 9 (1973).
There are a number of arguments against application of the fourth amendment to the license-
check stop. First, the license-check stop is analogous to inspections of commercial industries with
a long history of governmental regulation. See note 40 supra. Second, driving is not a right but a
privilege granted to citizens by the state. See Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 355 S.W.2d 686 (Ky.
1962). The Supreme Court, however, has rejected the right-privilege argument. See Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971); 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 16, at § 10.8, 381-82. Third,
before Terry, various courts had found that random license checks did not fall within the purview
of the fourth amendment. See Rodgers v. United States, 362 F.2d 358 (8th Cir. 1966). See gener-
ally 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 16, at § 10.8, 381 n.14.
70. 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979).
71. Id at 1396. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-58 (1976); United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-19 (1968).
The Delaware Supreme Court's finding that the stop violated article I, section 6 of the Delaware
Constitution raised the jurisdictional issue of whether the lower court judgment rested on an ade-
quate and independent state ground. See 99 S. Ct. at 1395-96. The United States Supreme Court
found, however, that the Delaware Supreme Court had rested its decision on its interpretation of
the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution, thus providing the Court with jurisdic-
tion over the case. Id
72. Id at 1396.
73. Id (citing Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978); United States v. Ramsey, 431
U.S. 606, 616-19 (1977); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555 (1976); United States
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Analogizing random license-check practices to roving border patrol
activity,74 the Court found these stops at least as intrusive, both physi-
cally and psychologically, as roving border patrol stops. 75 Law-en-
forcement officials conducting random license-check stops have
unbridled discretion. 76 Allowing this discretion without providing an
objective standard to govern its use invites intrusion on constitutionally
guaranteed rights.77 Additionally, motorists do not forfeit their expec-
tations of privacy simply because the vehicle is subject to governmental
regulation.78
The Court balanced the governmental interest in traffic safety
against this intrusion on individual rights.79 Although traffic safety is a
legitimate governmental interest,80 existing vehicle licensing, registra-
tion, and safety inspection requirements, when combined with police
action on observed violations, provide an adequate means of promot-
ing that interest.8 Because of the availability of the less-intrusive road-
block stop and other systematic means for determining motorist
compliance with licensing and registration statutes, the contribution of
the random license check to traffic safety is "marginal at best."8 2
The Court thus concluded that random license-check stops, like rov-
ing border patrol stops, are unreasonable under the fourth amendment
unless there is at least reasonable and articulable suspicion of a viola-
tion of law. 3
In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Powell,
asserted that checkpoint stops and other "not purely random stops" do
v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)).
74. 99 S. Ct. at 1397-98.
75. Id at 1398. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). The intrusion in
the roving border patrol case was "modest." Id at 880. By implication, the intrusion in Prouse
also is modest.
76. 99 S. Ct. at 1400. "This kind of standardless and unconstrained discretion is the evil the
Court has discerned when in previous cases it has insisted that the discretion of the official in the
field be circumscribed, at least to some extent." Id (citing Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413
U.S. 266, 270 (1973); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-33 (1967)).
77. Id (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968)).
78. Id at 1400-01.
79. Id at 1398.
80. Id
81. Id at 1398-1400.
82. Id at 1401.
83. Id
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not fall within the scope of the majority's holding.84 In addition, the
concurring justices maintained that the majority opinion was inapplica-
ble to random automobile examinations by game wardens in the per-
formance of their duties. 5
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, applied the balancing test to the facts,
but reached a contrary conclusion 86-that the state interest in traffic
safety allows it to employ the means necessary for the removal of unli-
censed drivers from the road. 7 He contended that the evidence before
the Court failed to show that an abuse of discretion had occurred or
was likely to occur in the future.88 In the absence of evidence that an
abuse of discretion was likely, the presumption of constitutionality ac-
corded acts of the state should stand.89
The Court's refusal to allow random license checks without an objec-
tive showing of reasonableness is commendable. The decision in
Prouse, which requires that an officer's motives for detaining a motorist
be articulable and premised on a reasonable suspicion of a violation of
law,90 lessens the defendant's burden of attempting to prove that an
unlawful motive lay behind the detention.9' By compelling the articu-
lation of an objective motive for the detention of a motorist, the deci-
sion in Prouse hampers the use of a license-check pretext in law
enforcement.
The Court's use of the roving border patrol cases as a guide is per-
suasive. The possibility of official abuse of discretion is identical
whether the authority to detain motorists is granted to local law-en-
forcement officials or to agents of the border patrol.92 Less persuasive,
however, is the Court's reliance on the border patrol cases to suggest 93
traffic checkpoints as an alternative to random stops. The border patrol
cases granted officials absolute discretion to detain motorists for a sec-
84. Id
85. Id
86. Id at 1401-03.
87. Id at 1402.
88. 1d at 1403.
89. Id
90. Id at 1401.
91. See 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 16, at § 10.8.
92. See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 894-95 (1975); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. 873 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25 (1968); 24 WAYNE L. REv. 1123, 1135 (1978).




ondary inspection.94 A traffic checkpoint modeled upon the alien
checkpoint would, no doubt, raise further issues in the aftermath of
Prouse.95 A traffic checkpoint prejudicially located to further the de-
tection of crimes unrelated to licensing, for example, would present
problems of subterfuge and abuse of discretion.96 Official action based
on an officer's observation of a traffic violation or other situations rais-
ing a reasonable suspicion that a vehicle is either unsafe or unregistered
or that the motorist is unlicensed provides a less objectionable means
for removing the unsafe or unregistered vehicle and the unlicensed
driver from the highway.9 7
The imposition of a standard of reasonableness on the actions of
law-enforcement officials conducting random automobile stops is not
unduly burdensome.9" The decision in Prouse eliminates pretext and
arbitrariness in random license checks and offers guidance for future
attempts to identify less-intrusive methods of traffic regulation.
94. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558-60 (1976); note 47 supra.
95, See generalhy Note, United States v, Martinez-Fuerte: The Fourth 4mendment Close to
the Edge?, 13 CAL. W.L. REV. 333, 351 (1977); Note, The,41ien Checkpoints and the Troublesome
Terarlogv United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 257 (1976).
96. 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 16. at § 10.8, 391-92.
97, 99 S. Ct. at 1399. See also 55 NEB. L. REv. 316, 332-34 (1976) (observable traffic viola-
tions provide means to inspect licenses and vehicle registration).
98. See United States %'. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U.S. 266 (1975). See genera/l Lukoff, supra note 4. The International Association of
Chiefs of Police stated that the Prouse decision would not pose "insurmountable difficulties" for
the police. Id at 6.
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